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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MnuNDA COMES OUT FROM UNDER
IN WITHROW V. WILLIAMS, THE SUPREME COURT
DECLINED TO EXTEND THE RULE FROM STONE V. POWELL TO
A STONE:

PRECLUDE FEDERAL COURTS FROM HEARING A STATE PRISONER'S
HABEAS CORPUS PETITION BASED ON AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF
THE PRISONER'S MIRANDA RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION

In Withrow v. Williams,' the United States Supreme Court
refused to bar federal habeas corpus 2 relief to a state prisoner who
claimed that his conviction was based on a confession that was
obtained in violation of his rights to remain silent and to counsel
under Miranda v. Arizona.3 Previously, in Stone v. Powell,4 the

Supreme Court held that, where the state provides an opportunity
for full and fair litigation of a claim that evidence was seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, federal courts cannot entertain
a habeas petition of a state prisoner who claims that such evidence
was introduced at trial in violation of the prophylactic exclusionary
rule.' Some commentators felt that the Supreme Court's opinion in
Stone reflected a decision by the Court to drastically restrict the
availability of federal habeas relief to state prisoners. 6 Although

1. 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993).
2. Habeas Corpus is:
The name given to a variety of writs ... having for their object to
bring a party before a court or judge .... The primary function of the
writ is to release from unlawful imprisonment. The office of the writ is
not to determine [a] prisoner's guilt or innocence, and [the] only issue
which it presents is whether [the] prisoner is restrained of his liberty by
due process.... [The writ is] [an independent proceeding instituted to
determine whether a defendant is being unlawfully deprived of his or her
liberty. It is not an appropriate proceeding for appeal-like review of
discretionary decisions of a lower court.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 491 (abr. 6th ed. 1991).
3. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. 428 U.S. 465, 466 (1976).
5. Id. The exclusionary rule provides that the products of a search that violated
a criminal defendant's Fourth Amendment rights must be excluded from evidence
at trial. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). The United States
Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule was applicable to the states in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
6. See, e.g., Richard A. Michael, The "New" Federalism and the Burger
Court's Deference to the States in Federal Habeas Proceedings, 64 IowA L. REv.
233, 234 (1979).
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subsequent to Stone the Supreme Court had refused in three instances
to extend the "rule of Stone" to bar federal habeas petitions of
state prisoners claiming other types of constitutional violations, 7 some
continued to believe that under Stone state prisoners would not be
able to frame viable federal habeas petitions based on prophylactic
rules such as Miranda's pre-questioning warnings.' By refusing to
extend the rule of Stone to preclude federal courts from granting
habeas relief to state prisioners whose petitions are based on the
prophylactic Miranda rule, the United States Supreme Court has
severely limited the rule of Stone and has left the doctrine of federal
habeas corpus in a state of uncertainty.
This casenote begins with a brief description of the facts of
Withrow v. Williams in Part I. In Part II, the note reviews the
legal background that set the stage for the decision in the subject
case. Part III of the note is an analysis of the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Withrow. Finally, the note discusses the potential
significance of the case in Part IV.

I.

FACTS

On April 10, 1985, in the process of investigating a double
murder, two police officers in Romulus, Michigan, went to the house
of Robert Allen Williams, Jr., and asked him to accompany them
to the police station for questioning concerning the crime.9 Although
one officer later testified that Mr. Williams was not under arrest
when he was taken to the station, a police report indicated that the
officers arrested Mr. Williams at his residence.' 0
While Mr. Williams initially denied any involvement in the
double murder, he began to implicate himself soon after the officers

7. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545 (1979); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
8. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, CUMuNAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF CASES
AND CONCEPTS § 33.02 (1993).
9. 113 S. Ct. at 1748. The police officers were investigating the murders of
Van Robin Hooper and Charles David Stanley, both of whom were killed while
sitting in Hooper's car on April 6, 1985. People v. Williams, 429 N.W.2d 649,
650 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). Hooper was shot four times in the head and once in
the neck. Id. Stanley was shot four times in the head, once in each hand, and
once each in the chest and back. Id. A witness at the scene originally thought
that a woman had committed the crime. Id.
10. 113 S. Ct. at 1748. Mr. Williams, who was asleep when the police arrived
at his residence, was probably searched but was not handcuffed before he entered
the officers' unmarked police car. 429 N.W.2d at 650-51. Mr. Williams testified
at his trial that one of the officers told him that he was under arrest when he
left his house. Id.
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started questioning him." After consulting with each other, the
officers decided not to advise Mr. Williams of his rights to remain
silent and to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona;2 instead, the officers
prodded Mr. Williams by telling him that they were only interested
in catching the "shooter."' 3 Mr. Williams continued to deny any
involvement in the crime, and one of the officers accused Mr.
Williams of lying and told him that they would "lock [him] up"
if he did not tell the truth.' 4 After this admonishment, Mr. Williams
made several incriminating statements; the police officers then advised
Mr. Williams of his Miranda rights.' 5 Mr. Williams waived his rights
and made more incriminating statements during subsequent questioning. 6 Mr. Williams was again questioned on April 11 and April
12; on April 12, the state of Michigan charged Mr. Williams with
17
murder.
Before trial, Mr. Williams moved to suppress his responses to
the police officers' questions.' 8 The trial court agreed to suppress
the responses that he made on April 11 and April 12, but refused
to suppress Mr. Williams's statements of April 10; the trial judge
felt that the police had, with respect to the April 10 statements,
advised Mr. Williams of his Miranda rights in a timely manner.' 9
After a bench trial, the court found that Mr. Williams was guilty
of two counts of first degree murder and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony. 20 The Court of Appeals of
Michigan affirmed the trial court's ruling on the April 10 statements, 2'
and the Supreme Court of Michigan denied leave to appeal. 22 The
United States Supreme Court denied Mr. Williams's petition for writ
of certiorari. 23

11. 113 S. Ct. at 1748.
12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
13. 113 S.Ct. at 1748.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Id. at 1749.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

21. People v. Williams, 429 N.W.2d 649, 651-52 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988). The
Michigan Court of Appeals held that the trial court was not clearly erroneous in
ruling that Mr. Williams was not the subject of a police investigation until he
made incriminating statements while in custody. Id. at 651.
22. People v. Williams, 440 N.W.2d 416 (Mich. 1989).
23. Williams v. Michigan, 493 U.S. 956 (1989).
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Mr. Williams subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus2 '
in the federal District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan,
alleging that his Miranda rights had been violated. 25 The district
court found that the police had placed Mr. Williams under arrest
when they threatened to "lock [him] up"; 26 consequently, the court
granted the writ and held that the Michigan trial court should have
excluded all of the statements Mr. Williams made between the time
that he was placed in custody and his receipt of the Miranda
warnings. 27 The court also concluded-even though Mr. Williams
had not raised the issue-that the statements Mr. Williams made
after he was given the Miranda warnings were involuntary and should
have been suppressed by the trial court. 28 The court determined that,
in relation to the statements that he made after receiving his Miranda
warnings, the "totality of circumstances" had overborne Mr. Wil29
liams's will.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed that the trial
court should have suppressed all of Mr. Williams's statements of
April 10, and accordingly affirmed the decision of the federal district
court.30 The court also refused to apply the rule in Stone v. Powell
3
to bar federal habeas review of Mr. Williams's Miranda claim. 1
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari32 and partially affirmed the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 33 The
Supreme Court held that the rule in Stone v. Powell did not preclude
federal habeas review of a state prisoner's Miranda claim.3 Thus,
the Court of Appeals had correctly held that the Michigan trial
court should have suppressed the statements that Mr. Williams made
before he received the Miranda warnings. 35 However, because the
admissibility of the statements that Mr. Williams made after he
received the warnings was not litigated in the federal district court,

24. 113 S. Ct. at 1749. Under the "Great Writ" of habeas corpus, a prisoner
may petition a federal court to release him because he is held in violation of the
laws or Constitution of the United States. See, e.g., WHrrEBREAD & SLOBOGIN,
supra note 8, § 33.01.
25. 113 S. Ct. at 1749.
26. Id. Once in custody, Mirandarequired that Williams be warned of his rights
before he was questioned. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966).
27. 113 S. Ct. at 1749.
28. Id.

29. Id.
30. Williams v. Withrow, 944 F.2d 284, 289-91 (6th Cir. 1991).

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 291.
113 S. Ct. at 1749.
Id.at 1756.
Id.at 1753-55.
Id.
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the Supreme Court held that the district court committed error by
addressing the involuntariness of those statements.36
II.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

To aid in understanding the legal issue presented in Withrow,
this part of the casenote discusses the historical development of

habeas corpus in the United States, especially as applied to state
prisoners. In addition, this section briefly addresses the evolution
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
A.

Historical Development of the Availability of Federal Habeas
Review for State Prisoners
1. Statutory Developments

The "Great Writ''37 of habeas corpus has its earliest origins in
the twelfth century. 38 In 1789, the drafters of the United States
Constitution ensured the continued existence of habeas corpus in
this country by precluding the abolishment of the writ except in the

36. Id. at 1755-56.

37. See 3 WuLLA BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 131
(9th ed., Garland Publishing, Inc. 1978) (1783).
38. The writ of habeas corpus was initially used as a coercive device by Norman
judges following the Battle of Hastings. WnnLAm F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 14-15 (1980). In 1176, the Assize of Clarendon, the
first great legislative enactment of Henry II, authorized the use of the writ to
compel the appearance of certain criminal defendants before the King's courts. Id.
at 15. By the fourteenth century, English judges were utilizing the writ to bring
litigants and jurors into their courts. Id. at 22-23.
The writ was first used as a mechanism for reviewing the legitimacy of a lower
court's ruling in the middle of the fourteenth century. Id. at 26-28. At that time
the Court of Chancery combined habeas corpus with the writ of certiorari to review
the incarceration of prisioners who had been sentenced by local courts. Id. at 2728. Similarly, the common law courts, concerned over the growing power of the
Court of Chancery, began using the writ to free those who had been detained by
the Chancellor. Id. at 33-40.
Following a fierce Constitutional battle between Parliament and the monarchy,
the modern concept of habeas corpus was born with Parliament's passage of the
habeas corpus act of the 31st of Charles II in 1679. Id. at 52-62; see also Ex
parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (stating the importance of the habeas
corpus act of 1679). This act protected individuals from arbitrary imprisonment
by the King. DUKER, supra at 52-62.
Prior to independence, all of the colonies recognized the writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 115. Sensitivity to the importance of the writ and concern over state autonomy
prompted the framers to include the habeas clause in the United States Constitution.
Id. at 135. The use of the writ has grown and evolved dramatically since that
time. See infra notes 39-105 and accompanying text.
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most extreme circumstances. 9 The writ has been governed by statute
since the first federal Judiciary Act in 1789.0 Today, the scope of
the writ of habeas corpus is governed by 28 U.S.C. sections 22412255.41
2.

Judicial Developments

Initially, the Supreme Court precluded federal habeas review
for state prisoners unless the state court that convicted the prisoner
lacked proper jurisdiction over the case. 42 For example, in Ex parte
Watkins43 the habeas petitioner claimed that his state court conviction
rested on an indictment that did not even state a crime." Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court refused to consider the habeas claim because it
determined that the state court had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. 41 On the other hand, the Court in Ex parte

39. The United States Constitution provides that: "The Privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or
Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (emphasis
added). Originally, the habeas clause was probably meant to refer only to the
suspension of habeas corpus in state courts for federal prisoners. DUKER, supra
note 38, at 129.
40. Federal Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 81-82 (1789). This act allowed federal
courts to issue the writ of habeas corpus for federal prisoners. Id. In 1867, Congress
extended the scope of habeas corpus by allowing federal courts to issue the writ
for state prisoners. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
41. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Particularly relevant here
is 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), which provides:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court
shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
42. See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. At common law, a court
sitting on habeas review was not limited to an examination of the jurisdiction of
the committing court. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 404 (1963).
43. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
44. Id. at 202-03, 206. In Kemp's Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 173,
186 (1809), the Court had held that a judgment rendered by an inferior court,
even if erroneous, is nonetheless a valid judgment that cannot be disregarded until
it is reversed. Relying on the holding in Kemp's Lessee, the Court in Watkins
concluded:
The question whether any offence was, or was not committed, that is,
whether the indictment did or did not show that an offence had been
committed, was a question which [the trial] court was competent to decide.
If its judgment was erroneous, a point which this court does not determine,
still it is a judgment, and, until reversed, cannot be disregarded.
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 206.
45. Id. at 209.
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Siebold46 determined that a state court did not properly have
jurisdiction over a case where the prisoner's conviction was based
on an unconstitutional statute. 47 Because the Siebold court determined
that the statutes on which the petitioners' convictions were based
were constitutional, though, it refused to grant the habeas petitions
in that case.41
Gradually, however, the Court expanded the availability of the
writ to state prisoners in a series of decisions that undermined the
earlier analysis which focused solely on whether the state court had
jurisdiction. In 1915, the first major inroad into the Court's
jurisdictional analysis of the availability of habeas corpus petitions
to state prisoners was announced in Frank v. Mangum. 49 There, the
Court held that a writ of habeas corpus would not issue for a state
prisoner when a competent and unbiased state court had already
considered the petitioner's federal claims. 0 The Court indicated,
however, that despite its previous analysis of state habeas cases only
to determine if the state court lacked jurisdiction, the Court now
would issue the writ even if the state court had jurisdiction where
the state had failed to provide a process adequate for the full and
fair litigation of federal claims. 5' Later, in 1942, the Court entirely
abandoned its jurisdictional approach to habeas petitions by state
prisoners in Waley v. Johnston. 2

46. 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
47. Id. at 376-77. The Court summarized the jurisdictional analysis of habeas
review as follows:
The only ground on which this court, or any court, without some special

statute authorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under
conviction and sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in
such court over the person or the cause, or some other matter rendering
its proceedings void.
Id. at 375 (italics omitted).

48. Id. at 398-99.
49. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
50. Id. at 335-36. The petitioner in Frank claimed, inter alia, that his state

trial had been dominated by a mob and that his conviction thus represented a
violation of due process of law. Id. at 333.
51. fl. at 335-36.
52. 316 U.S. 101 (1942); see also Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1768
(1993) (citing P. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
TE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1502 (3d ed. 1988)) (stating that the Court in Waley "openly

abandoned" the jurisdictional approach to habeas corpus). In Waley, the Court
determined that habeas review would be available where a "conviction [had] been
[obtained] in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused." Id. at 105. In
effect, Waley permitted a federal court to issue a writ of habeas corpus for a state
prisoner only where the state had failed to provide adequate corrective process.
WMHTEBEAD &

SLOBOGIN, supra note 8.
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In 1953, the Court drastically expanded the scope of federal
habeas corpus in Brown v. Allen." In that case, the habeas petitioner
claimed that North Carolina had acted in a racially discriminatory
fashion in the selection of the grand jury that had issued his indictment
and that his confession was inadmissible because it had been obtained
in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 4 The North Carolina Supreme
Court had considered and rejected both of the petitioner's arguments
on direct appeal."5 Despite the fact that the state court had provided
adequate corrective process for the petitioner's federal constitutional
claims, the United States Supreme Court determined that those claims
should be reconsidered on federal habeas review.5 6 By allowing habeas
review even where the state had provided adequate corrective process,
the Court opened the door for any habeas petition which alleged
that the accused was being held in violation of a federal constitutional
57

right.

3.

The Effect of Stone v. Powell on the Availability of
Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners

The number of federal habeas corpus petitions drastically
8
expanded in the wake of the Court's decision in Brown v. Allen.
The stage was thus set for Stone v. Powell9 and the Court's first
modern limitation on the broad scope of federal habeas jurisdiction

53. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
54. Id. at 466.
55. Id. at 447; State v. Brown, 63 S.E.2d 99 (N.C. 1951).
56. 344 U.S. at 447, 457-63. However, the majority in Brown stated that federal
habeas review would not be available to a state prisoner who had not "exhaustled]
available state remedies." Id. at 487. This requirement reflects the Supreme Court's
concern with the continued existence of comity between federal and state judicial
systems. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 437-38 (1963).
57. See Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASnN s L.J. 94i (99). in
Brown, Justice Frankfurter stated: "The State court cannot have the last say when
it, though on fair consideration and what procedurally may be deemed fairness,
may have misconceived a federal constitutional right." Id.; 344 U.S. at 508 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (stating that
Congress meant to provide a federal forum for a state prisoner's federal constitutional claims). It has been suggested that the Brown court, realizing in the face
of its increasing caseload that direct review on writ of certiorari was inadequate
to protect all state prisoners' federal constitutional claims, expanded the scope of
habeas corpus to provide a federal forum for all federal constitutional claims. See
Michael, supra note 6, at 238.
58. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142, 143 (1970). According to Judge Friendly, the
number of federal habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners increased from
541 in 1953 (the year Brown was decided) to 7,359 in 1969. Id.
59. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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that had been enunciated in Brown. In Stone, the habeas petitioner
alleged that the California trial court had improperly allowed the
introduction of incriminatory evidence at trial. 60 The Supreme Court
declined to consider the admissibility of the evidence, concluding
that a federal court could not entertain a habeas petition of a state
prisoner who claims that evidence was introduced at trial in violation
of the Fourth Amendment 6' where the state provides an opportunity
for full and fair litigation of the Fourth Amendment claim. 62
In making its decision that most state prisioners' Fourth
Amendment claims would not be cognizable on federal habeas review,
the Stone Court considered several factors. First, the Court noted
that the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right of
an accused individual, but rather a judge-made remedy designed to
deter the police from engaging in illegal searches and seizures. 63

60. Id. at 470. Lloyd Powell, the habeas petitioner in Stone, and three other
men attempted to steal a bottle of wine from a California liquor store on February
17, 1968. Id. at 469. After being confronted by the liquor store's manager, Powell
shot and killed the manager's wife. Id. Ten hours later, Powell was arrested in
Henderson, Nevada, for violating that city's vagrancy ordinance. Id. While searching
Powell, a Henderson police officer discovered that the prisoner was carrying a 38caliber revolver. Id. Powell was extradited to California and was subsequently
convicted of murder; at trial, the prosecutor introduced incriminating evidence
concerning the pistol that the Henderson police officer found. Id. at 469-70. Powell
alleged at trial, on direct review, and in his habeas petition that the Henderson
vagrancy ordinance was unconstitutional. Id. at 470. Accordingly, Powell contended
that the evidence concerning the discovery of the pistol was the product of an
illegal search and seizure and should have been excluded at trial. Id.
61. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In the watershed case of Weeks v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914), the Court determined that federal courts were compelled to follow
what is now known in popular parlance as the "exclusionary rule." See, e.g., 428
U.S. at 482-83. That is, federal courts could not consider evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against illegal searches and seizures.
232 U.S. at 398. The Court held the exclusionary rule applicable to the states in
Mapp v.'Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
62. 428 U.S. at 494. That determination was contrary to the Court's language
in an earlier decision in which it had held that "the federal habeas remedy extends
to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally obtained evidence was admitted
against them at trial." Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 225 (1969). At
least one commentator has suggested that the Court's decision in Stone was foreshadowed by Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973). Michael, supra note 6, at 246-47.
63. 428 U.S. at 486. According to the Court, " '[tihe rule is calculated to
prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
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Because the exclusionary rule is a remedial device rather than a
constitutional guaranty, its application is limited to those situations
in which its remedial objectives are "most efficaciously served.""4
Moreover, even on direct review, the exclusionary rule excludes
reliable and probative information from evidence; it thus diverts
attention from what should be the "central concern in a criminal
proceeding," the ultimate question of the guilt or innocence of the

accused.65
The Court concluded that, while the exclusionary rule's deterrent

effect justifies its application at trial and on direct review, the
marginal additional benefit obtained by application of the rule on
federal collateral review is outweighed by the costs. The Court

stated that application of the rule on habeas review would not
increase its deterrent effect.6 7 That is, it is unlikely that a police
officer would feel any additional compulsion to adhere to the guidelines
of the Fourth Amendment based on the tenuous possibility that an
illegal search and seizure would escape notice on direct review and

at trial, but might then result in the overturning of the prisoners
conviction on federal habeas review.6 Finally, because state court

guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it.' " Id. at 484 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
64. 428 U.S. at 486-87 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348
(1974)). For example, the Court has refused to apply the exclusionary rule at grand
jury proceedings. 414 U.S. at 338. Also, the Court has allowed prosecutors to use
unlawfully seized evidence in order to impeach the testimony of a criminal defendant.
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). The Court has further held that only
the victim of the unconstitutional search and seizure may invoke the exclusionary
rule. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
65. 428 U.S. at 489-90. The Court concluded that the rule's "deflect[ion of]
the truth-finding process ... often frees the guilty." Id. at 490.
66. 428 U.S. at 493-94. The exclusionary rule places extra burdens on the legal
system by deflecting the truth-finding process. Id. at 489-90. The Court also noted
that federal collateral review of state criminal convictions, especially when such
review is not premised upon the guilt or innocence of the petitioner, places many
extra burdens on the legal system which are not present on direct review. See id.
at 491 n.31. In particular, federal collateral review burdens the following values
that are important to our system of justice: " '(i) the most effective utilization of
limited judicial resources, (ii) the necessity of finality in criminal trials, (iii) the
minimization of friction between our federal and state systems of justice, and (iv)
the maintenance of the constitutional balance upon which the doctrine of federalism
is founded.' " Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring)).
67. 428 U.S. at 493.
68. Id. at 493. The Court stated that "there is no reason to believe ... that
the overall educative effect of the exclusionary rule would be appreciably diminished
if search-and-seizure claims could not be raised in federal habeas corpus review of
state convictions." Id. at 493.
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judges are no less able than federal court judges to protect a criminal
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, 69 there is no reason to allow
federal habeas review of state prisoners' Fourth Amendment claims
where the state has provided a full and fair opportunity for litigation
70
of those claims.
Response to the Court's decision in Stone was wide and varied.
Among the most thoughtful was the analysis of the case offered by
Professor Philip Halpern. 71 Although the Stone Court emphasized
the importance of truth-finding in the judicial process, 72 Professor
Halpern suggested that the decision in that case did not limit federal
habeas review of non-guilt related claims. 7 1 Instead, the Stone decision
would require the Court to engage in a three-step analysis to determine
whether to provide continued federal habeas review for alleged
74
violations of prophylactic rules.

According to Professor Halpern, the Court, when confronted
with the cognizability of a prophylactic rule on habeas review, should
first weigh the costs of the rule against its benefits. 75 Second, the
Court should determine whether the claim subject to preclusion from
habeas review could be easily converted into another claim that
would be cognizable on habeas corpus.7 6 Third, the Court should

69. Id. at 493-94 n.35. But cf. supra, note 57 (discussing various decisions in
which the Court determined that Congress intended for federal courts to have the
last say in the determination of a prisoner's federal constitutional claims).
70. 428 U.S. at 494.
71. Philip Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule
After Stone v. Powell, 82 COLUM. L. Rv. 1 (1982).
72. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
73. Halpern, supra note 71, at 38. However, Halpern's analysis of the case is
contrary to the opinion of other commentators. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover & T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86
YMALL.J. 1035 (1977). Professors Cover and Aleinikoff predicted that the decision
in Stone would ultimately preclude federal habeas review of any claim not based
on the guilt or innocence of the petitioner. Id. at 1086-88; see also 428 U.S. at
517-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe groundwork is being laid today for a
drastic withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction, if not for all grounds of alleged
unconstitutional detention, then at least for claims ...

that this Court later decides

are not 'guilt related.' "); Friendly, supra note 58, at 142 (suggesting that the
Supreme Court should limit federal habeas corpus review to those cases which
involve the guilt or innocence of the petitioner).
For another analysis of the Court's decision in Stone, see Louis M. Seidman,
Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change
in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. Rv. 436 (1980). Professor Seidman suggests
that the rule from Stone is very narrow, and that it is meant only to preclude
federal habeas review of state claims involving the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule. Id. at 450-56.
74. Halpern, supra note 71, at 40-41.
75. Halpern, supra note 71, at 40-41.
76. Halpern, supra note 71, at 41.
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determine the costs and benefits of adjudicating the two types of
claims.7 7 Professor Halpern specifically noted that it was "by no
means clear" that an application of his cost-benefit analysis to habeas
petitions premised on prophylactic Miranda claims would result in
78
the preclusion of those claims on federal habeas review.
4.

Supreme Court Decisions in the Aftermath of Stone v.
Powell

After the landmark decision in Stone, the Court refused to
apply Stone's preclusion rule in three cases that involved either the
innocence of the petitioner or that questioned the integrity of the
state judicial system .79 The habeas petitioner in Jackson v. Virginia,80
the first of those cases, alleged that there was insufficient evidence
to support his conviction of first degree murder. 81 The attorney for
the state of Virginia argued that, under the rule of Stone, the
petitioner's argument should not be cognizable on federal habeas
review . 2 The Supreme Court, however, rejected that argument and
held that Stone did not bar federal habeas review of the petitioner's
claim.

83

The Court mentioned three major differences between Stone
and Jackson.8 To begin with, the Court determined that cases such

77. Halpern, supra note 71, at 41. A finding that the claim subject to preclusion
could be easily reformed into a cognizable claim with more uncertain or unpredictable
legal guidelines would militate against prohibiting the claims. Id. at 38-40.
78. Halpern, supra note 71, at 40.
79. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545 (1979); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
80. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
81. Id. at 311-12. The petitioner was convicted of murdering Mary Houston
Cole, a woman who befriended him while he was a prisoner in a county jail. Id.
at 309-10. Several police officers testified at trial that, on the afternoon of Mrs.
Cole's death, the petitioner and Mrs. Cole had been drinking at a diner. Id. at
310. As the couple was preparing to leave the diner in their car, a deputy sheriff
noticed that the petitioner had a kitchen knife in his automobile and was carrying
a revolver. Id. The deputy "offered to keep the revolver until the petitioner sobered
up, but the petitioner indicated that this would be unnecessary since he and [Mrs.
Cole] were [going] to engage in sexual activity." Id. One and one-half days later,
Mrs. Cole was found naked from the waist down and dead in a secluded parking
lot, the victim of two gunshot wounds. Id. The petitioner did not deny that he
shot and killed Mrs. Cole; instead, he argued that, based on the mitigating factors
of self defense and voluntary intoxication, no rational finder of fact could have
found him guilty of first degree murder because there was insufficient evidence
that the crime was premeditated. Id. at 311.
82. 443 U.S. at 321.
83. Id.

84. Id. at 321-24.
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as Jackson will not unduly burden the federal courts with meritless
habeas claims because most meritorious challenges to the sufficiency
of the evidence will be corrected by state appellate courts.8 5 Also,
problems with the finality of criminal convictions and federal-state
comity will not be exacerbated by allowing habeas review of sufficiency
of the evidence claims, for such problems arise in all cases where
a state prisoner asks a federal court to correct constitutional errors
committed by the state courts.8 Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
the Court concluded that the constitutional issue in Jackson, unlike
that in Stone, is central to the question of guilt or innocence of
the petitioner.8 7 Consequently, Stone does not prevent federal habeas
review of a state prisoner's claim that there was insufficient evidence
88
to support her conviction.
The Court next declined to extend the rule from Stone in Rose
v. Mitchell.8 9 The habeas petitioners 90 in Rose claimed that there
was discrimination in the selection of the members of the grand
jury that indicted them for first degree murder. 91 While the State
of Tennessee argued that the petitioners' claims should not be
cognizable on federal habeas review, the Supreme Court held that
the rule in Stone did not preclude federal collateral review of a

85. Id. at 321-22. Because the state courts will presumably have fully considered
the sufficiency of the evidence claim, an independent evidentiary hearing by the
federal habeas court will rarely be necessary. Id. at 322.
86. Id. at 322-23. While the state appellate courts will adequately correct sufficiency of the evidence problems in most cases, "[i]t is the occasional abuse that
the federal writ of habeas corpus stands ready to correct." Id. at 322 (citing Brown
v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 498-501 (1953) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.)). The Court
also specifically rejected the argument that federal habeas review is unavailable any
time a state has given a petitioner a "full and fair hearing" in the state court
system. Id. at 323. The federal habeas statute presumes that a state provides the
petitioner with a fair trial and adequate appellate remedies; the statute does not,
however, presume that the state proceedings will always be held in accordance with
federal constitutional law. Id.
87. Id. at 323-24. According to the Court, all criminal defendants are constitutionally required to have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
323.
88. Id. at 324.
89. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
90. Both of the habeas petitioners were of African American descent. Id. at
548.
91. Id. at 549-50. The habeas petitioners, along with two other men, were
indicted for murdering two people during the commission of the robbery of White's
Cafe. Id. at 547-48. A jury subsequently convicted both habeas petitioners of two
counts of first degree murder. Id. at 549. The Supreme Court only considered
whether there was discrimination in the selection of the foreman of the grand jury.
Id. at 547, 550.
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claim that there was discrimination in the state's grand jury selection
process. 92
According to the Court, Rose was distinguishable from Stone
because, unlike its predecessor, Rose involved a claim that the state
judiciary itself had violated the Constitution. 93 Also, while Stone
involved a judicially created remedy, allegations of grand jury
94
discrimination involve charges that a person's Fourteenth Amendment
rights have been violated. 95 The Court further decided that the
federalism concerns that supported its decision in Stone were not
present in Rose because federal courts had, for almost 100 years,
granted relief to state prisoners in cases involving discrimination.9
Because none of the factors that led to the decision in Stone were
present in Rose,97 and because claims of discrimination in the selection
of grand juries impeach the integrity of the state judicial system
itself, the Court declined to extend the rule of Stone to preclude
federal habeas review of cases such as Rose. 9

92. Id. at 564.
93. Id. at 561-62. Since the state trial court would probably be the same court
in which the alleged discrimination took place, the Supreme Court was unwilling
to find that the petitioner in such a case would most likely receive a full and fair
hearing of the claim at the state level. Id. at 561. Instead, the Court determined
that an independent federal forum would be necessary to ensure a full and fair
hearing. Id. The Court stated that "Iflederal habeas review is necessary to ensure
that constitutional defects in the state judiciary's grand jury selection procedure
are not overlooked by the very state judges who operate that system." Id. at 563.
94. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
cqual protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
95. 443 U.S. at 561-62. This was a "fundamental" difference between the two
cases. Id. at 561. The Court stressed that, whereas the Fourteenth Amendment
had always been directly applicable to the states, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule had only recently been fully applied to the states. Id. at 562.
96. Id. Thus, reaffirmation of the fact that federal habeas review was still
available to redress state discrimination would not increase friction between the
states and the federal government. Id.
97. The Court reasoned that, unlike the exclusionary rule, continued federal
habeas review of a state prisoner's claim that discrimination existed in the selection
of the grand jury that indicted her would have a strong educative and deterrent
effect. Id. at 562-63. The Court explained that officials of a state judiciary system
could be expected to heed a federal court's opinion that declared that the state's
processes were discriminatory and must be changed. Id. at 563.
98. Id. at 563-64. In contrast to Stone, the Court concluded that the benefits
of hearing claims of grand jury discrimination on habeas review outweighed the
concomitant costs. Id. at 562-64.
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In Kimmelman v. Morrison,9 9 the Supreme Court concluded that
the rule in Stone should not be extended to Sixth Amendment' °°
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, even where the principal
allegation and manifestation of inadequate representation is counsel's
failure to file a timely motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 0' The Court in Kimmelman
reasoned that, unlike the judicially created exclusionary rule, the
Sixth Amendment guaranty of counsel is a personal constitutional
right.'02 Where a personal constitutional right such as the right to
effective counsel is involved, the Court cannot, as it did with the
judicially created exclusionary rule in Stone, weigh the benefits of
the application of the rule on habeas review with its costs because
the Constitution itself has struck that balance. 03
The Court acknowledged that the evidence as to which counsel
in Kimmelman had failed to object was probative and reliable; but
the Court noted that the right to effective counsel, including objections

99. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
100. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).

101. 477 U.S. at 382-83. Neil Morrison, the habeas petitioner, was convicted in
New Jersey of the rape of a fifteen year old girl. Id. at 368. A few hours after
the rape, which occurred at Morrison's home, the victim and a police officer
travelled to Morrison's residence. Id. Although Morrison was not home at the
time, a fellow tenant let the pair into his apartment. Id. The police officer removed
a sheet from Morrison's bed while she was in his apartment. Id. While Morrison's
attorney objected to the introduction of the sheet into evidence at trial, the lawyer
failed to comply with a New Jersey procedural rule that requires that suppression
of evidence motions be made within thirty days of indictment. Id. at 368-69. When
the trial court inquired as to why Morrison's counsel had not made the suppression
motion within the prescribed time period, the prosecutor replied that the defendant's
attorney did not know about the sheet because the defense had not conducted any
discovery in the case. Id. at 369. The trial judge thereafter allowed the prosecution
to enter the sheet into evidence. Id.
102. Id. at 375-79. The Court stated that the fact that the exclusionary rule was
not a personal constitutional right had been "crucial" to the decision in Stone.
Id. at 375. Moreover, the Court declined to state, as it had in Stone, that the
preclusion of federal habeas review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims
premised on incompetence in handling Fourth Amendment issues would not seriously
interfere with the habeas petitioners' constitutional rights, because a criminal defendant will many times not realize that his attorney is incompetent until he has
exhausted all appeals on direct review. Id. at 378.
103. Id. at 379.
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to evidence, is not premised upon the guilt or innocence of the
criminal defendant.' °4 As such, the rule in Stone does not extend
to bar habeas review of claims that a criminal defendant's counsel
was unconstitutionally ineffective in failing to suppress evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.' 5
B.

Historical Development of the Fifth Amendment Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination

The Fifth Amendment guarantees, among other things, that no
person will be compelled to testify against himself in a "criminal
case." 1° In 1897, the Supreme Court determined that the Fifth

104. Id. at 379-80. To show ineffective representation of counsel, a petitioner
must prove both incompetence and prejudice; in addition, the petitioner must
establish with a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel's errors, the result
in the case would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
694 (1984). Given this strict legal standard that a habeas petitioner who claims
that his counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective must meet, the Court also rejected
New Jersey's argument that allowing federal habeas review of the petitioner's claim
in Kimmelman would strip Stone of its meaning by permitting all habeas petitioners
to frame their Sixth Amendment claims as claims under the Fourth Amendment.
477 U.S. at 380-81.
105. 477 U.S. at 382-83.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in full that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id. (emphasis added).
The privilege against self-incrimination may have its origins in ancient Judaic
law. Debra Ciardiello, Note, Seeking Refuge in the Fifth Amendment: The Applicability of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Individuals who Risk
Incrimination Outside the United States, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 722, 724-25 (199192). Under Talmudic law, which embodied the ancient oral teachings of the laws
of Moses, the accused was prohibited from confessing to a crime. Laurence A.
Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness Doctrine in
Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 67 n.22 (1989). Thus, even if a:
criminal defendant confessed to a crime, that confession was inadmissable before
the Sanhedrin, the Jewish criminal court. Id. At least one commentator has implied
that Jesus invoked the privilege against self-incrimination when He refused to answer
to Pontius Pilate, a Roman governor. Id. at 67.
The privilege against self-incrimination was first used in the English legal system
in the Middle Ages as a response to inquisitorial proceedings used by the ecclesiastical
and common law courts. Ciardiello, supra at 725. During the sixteenth century,
these courts would require an accused individual to swear to an oath ex officio;
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Amendment privilege against self-incrimination precluded the
admissability of involuntary confessions made during custodial
interrogations. °7 The Court held the Fifth Amendment applicable
to the states in 1964.101 Before that time, the Court analyzed the
admissibility of a state criminal defendant's confession under a due
process' °9 approach in which it determined whether the "totality of
circumstances" leading to the confession overcame the defendant's
will and deprived her of her power of resistance." 0

the oath required the accused to give truthful answers to whatever questions the
court might ask. Ciardiello, supra note 725. People found the oath objectionable
for several reasons. Lisa Tarallo, Note, The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination: The Time Has Come for the United States Supreme Court to
End Its Silence on the Rationale Behind the Contemporary Application of the
Privilege, 27 NEw ENG. L. Rv. 137, 139 (1992). First of all, the accused was
required to swear to the oath before he knew the identity of his accusers or the
nature of the charges against him. Id. Also, although purportedly an oath of
inquiry, the procedure was actually designed to extract a confession. Id. A prisoner
was assumed to have confessed to the crime against which he was charged if he
refused to answer questions or swear to the oath. Ciardiello, supra at 725. Moreover,
the ecclesiastical courts were empowered to use torture to ensure that the accused
would speak. Tarallo, supra at 139.
The Puritans were very outspoken in their opposition to the oath ex officio.
Torallo, supra at 139. They felt that the oath gave the ecclesiastical courts the
power to identify and restrict the activities of religious dissenters. Tarallo, supra
at 139-40. At the same time, the common law courts were concerned about the
increasing power that the use of the oath gave their ecclesiastical counterparts.
Tarallo, supra at 140. Consequently, the common law courts restricted the circumstances in which the ecclesiastical courts could use the inquisitorial process.
Tarallo, supra at 140. By 1661 the ecclesiastical courts were prohibited from using
the oath under any circumstances. Tarallo, supra at 140 n.33.
The common law courts continued to employ the oath ex officio even after its
abolition in the ecclesiastical courts. Tarallo, supra at 140-41. By the end of the
seventeenth century, though, accused persons began to refuse to swear to the oath,
claiming that they had a right against self-incrimination. Tarallo, supra at 141.
The common law courts gradually began to recognize the privilege against selfincrimination, and it eventually became a firm rule of law. Tarallo, supra at 141.
Indeed, the common law privilege was extremely broad. Ciardiello, supra at 726.
A criminal defendant could, for example, invoke the privilege simply to avoid
defamation of character. Ciardiello, supra at 726.
English common law influenced the development of law in America, and the
colonies began to appreciate the privilege against self-incrimination at the end of
the seventeenth century. Ciardiello, supra at 726. The privilege was ultimately
written into the United States Bill of Rights without debate. Ciardiello, supra at
727.
107. See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 565 (1897).
108. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1964).
109. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state will deprive a person
of her life, liberty, or property without due process of the law. See supra note
94.
110. See, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957). The totality of circum-
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The landmark decision in modem Fifth Amendment jurisprudence
was Miranda v. Arizona."' There, the Court held that a state
prisoner's confession was unconstitutionally compelled unless, before
was informed
being subjected to a custodial interrogation, the accused
2
of his rights to remain silent and to counsel."
Since the inception of the Miranda doctrine, the Supreme Court
has recognized that the specific warnings mandated in that case are
not themselves constitutional rights, but instead are judicially created
prophylactic rules designed to protect rights that the Constitution
does specifically guarantee." 3 Therefore, a state may satisfy the Fifth
Amendment requirement by using other equally effective methods
to apprise the criminal defendant of her rights." 4 In addition, the
Court has acknowledged that the Miranda requirements are very
broad and could possibly exclude some confessions that would
otherwise be allowed under the Fifth Amendment.' Therefore, the6
requirements have sometimes been labelled "prophylactic.""1

stances approach was used to determine whether a confession had been made
" 'freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort.' " Haynes
v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963) (quoting Wilson v. United States, 162
U.S. 613, 623 (1896)).
111. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
112. Id. at 478-79. The Court had actually discarded the totality of circumstances
approach to unconstitutionally compelled confessions two years before Miranda.
See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (applying the Sixth Amendment
guranty of counsel to exclude from evidence statements made by an indicted person
in the absence of his attorney). In Miranda, the Court required that, before a
custodial interrogation or other significant deprivation of freedom by authorities
and in the absence of other equally protective measures, the states advise an
individual that:
[H]e has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used
against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed
for him prior to any questioning if he so desires .... After such warnings
have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions
or make a statement.
384 U.S. at 479. The Court now uses the totality of circumstances test to determine
the admissibility of an alleged unconstitutionally coerced confession made after the
prisoner has properly been advised of her Miranda rights. See, e.g., Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1985).
113. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
114. Id. at 447.
115. Id.; see also Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (stating that the
Miranda requirements might exclude some confessions that would otherwise be
admissible under the Fifth Amendment).
116. Duckworth v. Eagen, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298, 305 (1985) (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)).
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Moreover, the warnings from Miranda are not required in all
circumstances." 7 For example, when the public safety is threatened
there is no requirement that a person must be advised of his rights
before being subjected to an interrogation." 8
III.

REASONING OF THE COURT IN WiTHROW

In Withrow, the Supreme Court declined to extend the rule
from Stone to preclude federal review of a state prisoner's claim
that his conviction was based on a confession obtained in violation
of Miranda."9 The Court acknowledged that the Miranda requirements are not mandated by the Constitution and, for the purposes
of the decision in Withrow, that they are prophylactic. 20 Labelling
the requisite warnings under Miranda as prophylactic, however, does
not, the Court concluded, necessarily equate them with the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio.'21 Indeed, the Court determined that
the Miranda requirements differed from the exclusionary rule in two
fundamental respects. '2
The Court stated that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
serves as a deterrent to prevent future police misconduct; it does
not, however, remedy the fact that the criminal defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights were violated. 23 To the contrary, the Miranda
requirement of advising the suspect of his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination in advance of questioning does help protect
"a fundamental trial right"' 24 and may prevent a present violation
rather than merely deter a future violation. 25 Also, while the exclusionary rule often deflects the truth-finding process by preventing
the introduction of probative and reliable evidence, 26 the Fifth
Amendment trial right protected by Miranda is not necessarily divorced from the notion of the criminal defendant's guilt or innocence. 27 This is true, according to the Court, because a system of

117. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (finding that, with some
limited exceptions, Miranda's prophylactic rule is only applicable when there has
been some form of officially coerced self-incrimination).
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 657-58.
Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1751-55 (1993).
Id. at. 1752.
Id. at 1753.

122. Id.
123. Id.

124. Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)).
125. 113 U.S. at 1753. The Fifth Amendment represents "principles of humanity

and civil liberty, which had been secured in the mother country only after years
of struggle."

Id. (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 544 (1897)).

126. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
127. 113 S. Ct. at 1753.
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criminal justice that relies on confessions will ultimately be less
reliable than one that relies on independent investigation. 128 The
Miranda requirements, then, guard against the use of unreliable
statements at trial by preventing the possibility of police coercion
of confessions.

129

Seemingly most important to the Court's decision to continue
to allow Miranda claims to be reviewed by federal courts on habeas,
however, was the fact that precluding habeas review of such claims
would not benefit the federal courts or significantly advance the
cause of federalism. 130 For, precluding federal courts from considering
Mirandaclaims on habeas review would simply prompt state prisoners
to reframe their habeas petitions to allege that their convictions
rested on involuntary confessions. 3 ' Thus, eliminating Miranda claims
from federal habeas review would not significantly ease the caseload
32
burden of the federal courts.
Moreover, because each reformulated Miranda claim couched
in terms of an involuntary confession would require an "independent
federal determination" on habeas, precluding all Miranda claims
from federal habeas review would not reduce tensions between the
state and federal courts.'33 Significant here was the fact that the
federal courts could not be expected to overturn state court convictions based on Miranda violations with such frequency as to
appreciably raise federal-state tensions. 3 4 Further, while the Court
recognized that state police are currently able and willing to satisfy
Miranda's requirements, it noted that the writ of habeas corpus is
designed to correct "the occasional abuse."' 3 5
Finally, the Court determined that, because the habeas petitioner
had not raised the issue, both the district court and the court of
appeals had committed error by finding that the petitioner's statements made after he received the requisite Miranda warnings were

128. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448 n.23 (1974) (quoting
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964))).
129. 113 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730
(1966)).
130. 113 S. Ct. at 1754.
131. Id. This would require the federal courts to determine whether a confession
was voluntary by looking to the "totality of circumstances." Id.; see supra note
112.
132. 113 S.Ct. at 1754. The Court stated that it could "lock the front door
against Miranda, but not the back." Id.
133. Id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985)).
134. Id. at 1754-55.
135. Id. at 1755 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 322 (1979)).
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involuntary. 3 6 The Court otherwise affirmed the case and remanded
it for further proceedings.'1
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor, with whom Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined, alleged that the doctrine of habeas corpus profoundly affects the finality of criminal trials. 38 Consequently, federal
courts have the power to refuse to grant habeas relief based on
prudential concerns, such as equity and federalism. 39 Application
of the prophylactic Miranda rule has both benefits and costs;' 40 on
collateral review, the balance between the costs and benefits of
applying Miranda shifts.' 4 ' Justice O'Connor concluded that concerns
of finality, federalism, and fairness militate against allowing federal
42
habeas review of Miranda claims.
Justice O'Connor also disagreed with the majority's assertion43
that the Miranda requirements represent a fundamental trial right.
Justice O'Connor alleged that, while the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is a fundamental trial right, the Miranda
warning requirement is not.'" Also, Justice O'Connor reasoned that
it was unreasonable to assume that barring Miranda claims from
federal habeas review would lead all affected petitioners to reframe
their habeas petitions to allege that their confessions were involuntary. 45 Finally, the rarity of habeas writs issued for Miranda
violations counsels for, not against, the preclusion of Miranda claims
on habeas review.'"

136. Id. at 1755-56.
137. Id. at 1756.
138. Id. at 1756 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1757 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This notion is grounded in the federal
habeas statute, which requires the federal courts to " 'dispose of [habeas petitions]
as law and justice require.' " Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1988)). In addition,
the Supreme Court itself has recognized that "in some circumstances considerations
of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal justice require
a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power." 113 S. Ct. at
1757 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 539
(1976)).
140. 113 S. Ct. at 1758 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Miranda requirements
are beneficial because the exclusion of unwarned confessions compels state and
local police departments to adopt procedural safeguards against the procurement
of compelled or involuntary statements. Id. The Miranda requirements are costly,
however, because they suppress trustworthy statements and thus impair the truthfinding process. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1759-60 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1761 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1762 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 1764-65 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joined, also dissented
from the majority's opinion. According to Justice Scalia, Stone did
not affect the jurisdiction of federal courts over Fourth Amendment
claims; rather, that case held that federal courts should not consider
such claims where the petitioner already had a full and fair chance
to litigate the issue.147 Justice Scalia alleged that "[p]rior opportunity
to litigate an issue . . . should ordinarily preclude [a federal] court
from reaching the merits of a claim, unless it goes to the fairness
of the trial process or to the accuracy of the ultimate result."'4 In
conclusion, Justice Scalia noted that the prior opportunity for full
and fair litigation is normally dispositive of a federal prisioner's
habeas claim, and he argued that such a disparity between federal
and state convictions is illogical.1 49
IV.

SIGNIFICANCE

The Supreme Court's opinion in Withrow v. Williams is important because it was the first occasion on which the Court applied
the rule from Stone to a case that involved neither the innocence
of the habeas petitioner nor the integrity of a state's judicial process.'"
Instead, Withrow involved the prophylactic Miranda requirements.,'
After Stone v. Powell, some felt that the Court had adopted a guiltrelated view of habeas corpus . 2 However, by refusing to deny the
petitioner's claim in Withrow, the Court indicated that it is willing
to allow habeas petitions that do not involve the guilt or innocence
of the incarcerated individual.
Because some commentators felt that the rule of Stone was
valid precedent for the preclusion of all habeas petitions involving
prophylactic rules unrelated to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner,"13 the decision in Withrow has left habeas corpus jurisprudence
in the United States in a state of uncertainty. While it is now clear
that the Supreme Court has not adopted a guilt-related view of

147. Id. at 1767 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546
F.2d 1204, 1211-12 (5th Cir. 1977) ("Despite the assertions of the Supreme Court
in Stone to the contrary, we would be blind to reality to pretend that the practical
effect of that decision is not a limitation on federal court jurisdiction.").
148. 113 S. Ct. at 1768 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

149. Id. at 1769-70 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
150. See supra notes 79-105 and accompanying text.
151. 113 S. Ct. at 1752.

152. See 428 U.S. at 516-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Michael, supra note 6,
at 233; Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 73, at 1087-88.
153. See 428 U.S. at 516-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Michael, supra note 6,
at 233; Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 73, at 1087-88.
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habeas, the influence that the rule in Stone will have on future
habeas petitions is unclear. At least one commentator has previously
suggested that the Court meant to limit the decision in Stone to
the facts of that case. 5 4 Nonetheless, although the Court has thus
far refused to extend the rule from Stone beyond Fourth Amendment
claims,' it has continued to apply the rule in subsequent cases. 5 6
This indicates that the Court believes that the decision in Stone is
a viable rule of law that could further restrict the availability of
habeas corpus.
Perhaps Professor Halpern was correct when he suggested that
the Court's decision in Stone indicated that it was adopting a costbenefit analysis of habeas corpus petitions involving prophylactic
rules. 57 Only by applying the cost-benefit analysis to Withrow can
one harmonize that case with Stone. Consistent with the cost-benefit
analysis, the majority in Withrow first weighed the costs of the
prophylactic Miranda requirements against their benefits."" The Court
determined that, unlike the Fourth Amendment claim that was at
issue in Stone, the Miranda requirements protect a "fundamental
trial right" that is "not necessarily" divorced from the guilt or
innocence of the petitioner. 5 9 Consequently, the Court concluded
that the benefits of applying the Miranda requirements on habeas
outweigh the costs.
Also consistent with the cost-benefit analysis, the Withrow majority next determined that Miranda claims, if precluded from habeas
review, could easily be converted into involuntary confession claims
that would be cognizable on federal habeas corpus.160 Finally, while
the Court did not specifically determine the costs and benefits of
adjudicating the two types of claims, it did determine that each
reformulated Miranda claim would require an independent federal
determination on habeas.' 16 As such, eliminating federal habeas re62
view of Miranda claims would serve no "appreciable" benefits.
The Court thus implicitly determined that the costs and benefits of
adjudicating the two types of claims were equal, and it therefore

154. Seidman, supra note 73, at 452-55.
155. Seidman, supra note 73, at 453-55.
156. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986); Rose v. Mitchell, 443
U.S. 545 (1979); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
157. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
158. Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1751-53 (1993).
159. Id.at 1753.
160. Id. at 1754.

161. Id.
162. Id.
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decided that it would be useless to preclude habeas petitioners from
16
raising Miranda claims. 1
By applying Professor Halpern's cost-benefit analysis to Withrow, one is able to harmonize that case with Stone. Although both
cases involved prophylactic rules, the Court in Withrow determined
that the benefits of applying the Miranda requirements on habeas
review outweighed the concomitant costs. To the contrary, the Stone
court had determined that the cost of evaluating Fourth Amendment
claims on habeas review exceeded the benefits. Withrow is significant,
then, because it establishes that the Court will undertake a costbenefit analysis whenever it is confronted with the cognizability of
a prophylactic rule on habeas review.
Marcus N. Bozeman

163. See id. It is also important to note that Justice O'Connor, in her dissent,
used the same cost-benefit analysis as the majority. Id. at 1756-65 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor merely differed from the majority in her ultimate
determinations under the analysis. Id.

